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(p.	329)	28		Israel’s	Airstrike	Against	Iraq’s	Osiraq	Nuclear	Reactor—
1981
I.		Facts	and	Context
On	7	June	1981,	a	team	of	eight	F-16	and	six	F-15	fighter	jets	of	the	Israeli	air	force	carried	out	an	airstrike	on	Iraqi	territory. 	The	target	of	the
attack	was	the	‘Osiraq’	nuclear	reactor	at	the	Tuwaitha	research	centre	near	Baghdad.	The	Osiraq	reactor	was	one	of	two	research	reactors
being	built	pursuant	to	a	French–Iraqi	framework	agreement	and	subsequent	contracts. 	The	two-minute	airstrike—which	was	reportedly
carried	out	before	the	reactor	was	loaded	with	12.5	kg	of	enriched	uranium,	to	be	supplied	by	the	French —effectively	destroyed	the	$275
million	Osiraq	reactor.	Four	persons,	including	one	French	technician,	were	killed	in	the	attack.	Both	the	UN	Security	Council	(UNSC)	and
the	UN	General	Assembly	(UNGA)	formally	condemned	the	operation.
II.		The	Positions	of	the	Main	Protagonists	and	the	Reaction	of	Third	States
and	International	Organizations
The	Osiraq	raid	marked	the	first	deliberate	destruction	of	a	nuclear	reactor	and	the	first	time	a	country	openly	attacked	the	nuclear	facilities	of
another. 	Israel	justified	its	conduct	as	a	case	of	so-called	‘anticipatory’	self-defence.	To	support	this	position,	it	drew	attention	to	the	hostile
attitude	of	Iraq,	which	had	refused	to	recognize	Israel’s	right	to	exist	and	remained	technically	at	war	with	Israel.	In	an	open	challenge	to	the
existing	non-proliferation	regime,	Israel	moreover	claimed	that,	notwithstanding	International	Atomic	(p.	330)	Energy	Agency	(IAEA)
monitoring,	the	reactor	was	designed	to	produce	atomic	bombs.	In	spite	hereof,	the	raid	was	widely	condemned	throughout	the	international
community.
On	8	June	1981,	the	day	after	the	attack,	Israel	reported	to	the	UNSC	that	it	had	destroyed	the	Osiraq	reactor,	which	‘despite	its	camouflage,
[was]	designed	to	produce	atomic	bombs.	The	target	for	such	bombs	would	be	Israel’. 	According	to	Israel,	Iraqi	President	Saddam	Hussein
had	stressed	that	the	reactor	was	being	constructed	against	Israel	(although	it	was	later	demonstrated	that	this	quote	was	taken	out	of
context ).	Furthermore,	Israel	submitted	that	the	reactor	would	soon	be	completed	and	be	put	into	operation.	Confronted	with	‘a	mortal	danger
to	the	people	of	Israel	progressively	[arising]’,	Israel	had	chosen	to	act	in	defence	of	its	citizens.	Israel	stressed	that,	had	the	airstrike	been
postponed	until	after	the	reactor	would	have	become	operational	and	‘hot’,	this	would	have	‘brought	about	a	massive,	radioactive,	lethal	fallout
over	the	city	of	Baghdad,	and	tens	of	thousands	of	its	innocent	residents	would	have	been	hurt’. 	The	letter	also	emphasized	that	the	operation
had	been	timed	for	Sunday	in	order	to	avoid	loss	of	life	among	the	foreign	experts	employed	at	the	reactor.
In	subsequent	UN	meetings, 	Israel	emphasized	that	Iraq	had	consistently	refused	to	recognize	Israel’s	right	to	exist	and	declared	itself	to
have	been	in	a	state	of	war	with	Israel	since	1948. 	Israel	further	insisted	that,	in	spite	of	the	officially	‘peaceful’	nature	of	Iraq’s	nuclear
programme,	Iraq	was	in	reality	seeking	to	obtain	nuclear	weapons.	To	substantiate	its	accusations,	Israel	referred	to	statements	by	Iraqi
officials	stressing	the	need	for	the	Arab	states	to	produce	an	atomic	bomb. 	It	also	drew	attention	to,	inter	alia,	Iraq’s	refusal	(vis-à-vis
France)	to	be	supplied	with	alternative	combustibles	for	the	reactor	other	than	weapons-grade	nuclear	fuel, 	as	well	as	to	the	fact	that	Iraq
had	no	need	for	nuclear	energy	given	its	abundant	oil	supplies. 	While	acknowledging	that	Iraq	was	a	party	to	the	nuclear	Non-Proliferation
Treaty	(NPT)	and	that	its	nuclear	reactors	had	been	inspected	periodically	by	the	IAEA,	Israel	insisted	that	there	were	serious	loopholes	in
the	non-proliferation	safeguards	system	that	could	easily	be	exploited	by	a	country,	such	as	Iraq,	determined	to	obtain	a	nuclear	weapon.
As	Israel’s	‘public	and	diplomatic	efforts’,	including	calls	for	a	nuclear-weapon-free	zone	in	the	Middle	East,	went	unheeded, 	and	the	Osiraq
reactor	was	about	to	go	‘hot’—making	it	impossible	to	attack	it	without	blanketing	Baghdad	with	massive	radioactive	fallout—Israel	had	acted
to	protect	the	lives	of	its	citizens.	In	particular,	in	destroying	the	reactor,	Israel	had	exercised	‘its	inherent	and	natural	right	to	self-defence,	as
Prev	|	Next
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
From:	Oxford	Public	International	Law	(http://opil.ouplaw.com).	(c)	Oxford	University	Press,	2015.	All	Rights	Reserved.	Subscriber:	Gent	University;	date:	25
June	2018
Expand	All |	Collapse	All
Preliminary	Material
Main	Text
1	Introduction:	The	Jus	Contra
Bellum	and	the	Power	of	Precedent
2	The	Caroline	Incident—1837
Part	1	The	Cold	War	Era	(1945–89)
3	The	Korean	War—1950–53
4	The	Suez	Crisis—1956
5	The	Soviet	Intervention	in
Hungary—1956
6	The	U-2	Incident—1960
7	The	Belgian	Intervention	in
the	Congo—1960	and	1964
8	The	Indian	Intervention	in
Goa—1961
9	The	Cuban	Missile	Crisis—
1962
10	The	Gulf	of	Tonkin	Incident
—1964
11	The	US	Intervention	in	the
Dominican	Republic—1965
12	The	Six	Day	War—1967
13	The	Intervention	in
Czechoslovakia—1968
14	The	USS	Pueblo	Incident—
1968
15	The	Indian	Intervention	into
(East)	Pakistan—1971
16	The	Yom	Kippur	War—1973
17	Turkey’s	Intervention	in
Cyprus—1974
18	The	Mayaguez	Incident—
1975
19	The	Entebbe	Raid—1976
20	The	Larnaca	Incident—1978
21	The	Vietnamese
Intervention	in	Cambodia—
1978
22	The	Ugandan–Tanzanian
War—1978–79
23	Operation	Litani—1978
24	The	Lebanon	War—1982
25	The	Soviet	Intervention	in
Afghanistan—1979–80
26	The	US	Hostage	Rescue
Operation	in	Iran—1980
27	The	Iran–Iraq	War—1980–
88
28	Israel’s	Airstrike	Against
Iraq’s	Osiraq	Nuclear	Reactor
—1981
I	Facts	and	Context
II	The	Positions	of	the
Main	Protagonists	and	the
Reaction	of	Third	States
and	International
Organizations
III	Questions	of	Legality
IV	Conclusion:
Precedential	Value
29	The	US	Intervention	in
Nicaragua—1981–88
30	The	Falklands/Malvinas	War
—1982
31	South	African	Incursions
into	Lesotho—1982
32	The	Intervention	of	the
United	States	and	other
Eastern	Caribbean	States	in
Grenada—1983
33	The	Israeli	Raid	Against	the
PLO	Headquarters	in	Tunis—
1985
34	The	Killing	of	Khalil	al-Wazir
by	Israeli	Commandos	in	Tunis
—1988
35	The	US	Strikes	Against
Libya—1986
36	The	US	Intervention	in
Panama—1989
Part	2	The	Post-Cold	War	Era
(1990–2000)
Part	3	The	Post	9/11-Era	(2001–)
Further	Material
Sign	up	for	alerts
understood	in	general	international	law	and	well	within	the	meaning	of	Article	51	[of	the
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(p.	331)	UN	Charter]’. 	Referring	to	the	Caroline	affair 	and	quoting	scholars	such	as	Waldock,	Bowett,	Schwebel,	and	McDougal, 	Israel
took	the	view	that	the	right	of	self-defence	did	not	require	a	state	to	suffer	the	first,	and	possibly	fatal,	blow.	According	to	Israel,	the	concept	of
self-defence	had	‘broadened	with	the	advance	of	man’s	ability	to	wreak	havoc	on	his	enemies.	Consequently,	the	concept	took	on	new	and	far
wider	application	with	the	advent	of	the	nuclear	era. 	Thus,	Israel	argued,	‘the	concepts	of	“armed	attack”	had	to	be	read	in	conjunction	with
…	the	present-day	criteria	of	speed	and	power,	and	placed	within	the	context	of	the	circumstances	surrounding	nuclear	attack’.
Iraq,	for	its	part,	strongly	condemned	the	‘clear-cut	act	of	premeditated	aggression’	committed	against	it,	stressing	that:
[t]he	attack	carried	out	by	Israel	against	Iraq	is	clearly	an	act	of	aggression	in	accordance	with	the	provisions	of	the	Charter	as
expounded	on	in	the	Definition	of	Aggression	in	General	Assembly	resolution	3314	(XXIX).	The	Israeli	allegation	that	it	acted	in
legitimate	self-defence	is	totally	unfounded,	in	fact	and	in	law.
What	is	more,	throughout	a	series	of	debates	within	the	UNSC 	and	the	UNGA, 	third	states	levelled	the	Israeli	arguments	to	the	ground.
One	after	the	other,	member	states	pointed	out	that	the	target	being	attacked	was	a	peaceful	research	facility,	and	that,	contrary	to	Israel
itself —which	had	refused	to	accede	to	the	NPT	and	was	widely	believed	to	have	clandestinely	acquired	nuclear	weapons—Iraq	was	a	party
to	the	NPT	and	had	always	complied	with	the	IAEA	inspection	regime. 	Of	considerable	importance	were	the	positions	of	France,	which	had
been	closely	involved	in	the	construction	of	the	facility,	and	of	the	IAEA.	France	firmly	rejected	the	Israeli	allegations	that	the	reactor	was
intended	to	produce	atomic	bombs, 	insisting	instead	that	its	sole	purpose	was	scientific	research.	France	dismissed	as	groundless	Israeli
allegations	pertaining	to	the	risk	of	diversion	of	enriched	uranium	and	the	production	of	plutonium. 	It	stressed	that	Iraq	had
References
(p.	332)	entered	into	all	the	necessary	implementation	agreements	with	the	IAEA	and	that	France	itself	had	also	made	sure	‘that	no	measure
would	be	neglected	to	guarantee	the	use	of	the	supplies	[of	nuclear	fuel]	for	exclusively	peaceful	purposes’. 	IAEA	Director-General	Eklund
affirmed	before	the	Security	Council	that	the	two	Iraqi	reactors	had	been	subject	to	periodical	inspections,	and	that	these	inspections	had
revealed	that	no	nuclear	material	had	been	diverted	from	peaceful	purposes. 	The	last	inspection	had	taken	place	in	January	1981.	Another
inspection	had	been	scheduled	to	take	place	later	in	June	1981.	The	IAEA	stressed	that,	due	to	the	design	of	the	facility	and	the	fuel	elements,
diversion	of	fuel	elements	for	non-peaceful	purposes	would	have	been	easily	detected. 	In	addition,	it	was	asserted	that,	contrary	to	what
Israel	had	argued,	the	IAEA	was	well	aware	of	the	existence	of	a	vault	under	the	Osiraq	reactor,	and	that	this	space	could	not	be	used	to
produce	plutonium.
Numerous	UN	members	stressed	that	all	states—including	oil-producing	states—had	the	right	to	develop	nuclear	technology	for	peaceful
purposes. 	Several,	including	the	United	States,	insisted	that	if	Israel	had	had	doubts	about	the	peaceful	nature	of	Iraq’s	nuclear	programme,
it	should	have	pursued	peaceful	measures,	for	instance,	by	raising	the	matter	before	the	Security	Council	or	the	IAEA. 	Israel’s	attack	on	a
reactor	subject	to	IAEA	inspections	was	widely	deemed	to	undermine	the	international	non-proliferation	regime	(a	view	shared	by	the	IAEA
itself). 	Dozens	of	states	denounced	Israel’s	conduct	as	a	(premeditated)	act	of	aggression, 	or	at	least	as	a	serious	violation	of	the	UN
Charter. 	All	states	intervening	in	the	debates	condemned	the	strike—albeit	that	the	United	States	offered	a	rather	mild	rebuke	(essentially
condemning	Israel’s	failure	to	exhaust	peaceful	means).
Interestingly,	several	UN	members	explicitly	discarded	Israel’s	invocation	of	the	right	of	self-defence.	Thus,	the	suggestion	that	self-defence
could	be	exercised	‘preventively’	against	future,	non-imminent	threats,	was	widely	denounced.	Numerous	states	from	all	regions	warned	that
such	a	broad	reading	of	the	right	of	self-defence	had	no	basis	in
References
(p.	333)	international	law;	that	it	would	leave	it	up	to	states	themselves	to	decide	at	their	discretion	whether	recourse	to	force	was	suited	to
tackle	a	hypothetical	security	threat;	and	that	it	would	replace	the	Charter	rules	with	the	‘law	of	the	jungle’. 	Because	of	the	‘obvious	dangers’
involved,	the	European	Community,	for	instance,	refused	to	accept	that	Article	51	should	be	interpreted	far	more	widely	‘to	allow	a	pre-
emptive	strike	by	one	State	against	what	it	alleges	to	be	the	nuclear-weapon	development	programme	of	another,	potentially	hostile,	State’.
Sweden,	like	many	others,	agreed	that	the	proposed	interpretation	of	self-defence	meant	that	the	concept	could	be	extended	‘almost
limitlessly	to	include	all	conceivable	future	dangers,	subjectively	defined’.
A	number	of	states	intervening	in	the	debates	acknowledged	(explicitly	or	implicitly)	the	permissibility	of	some	of	form	of	anticipatory	self-
defence,	but	were	quick	to	stress	that	Israel’s	actions	did	not	meet	the	imminence	requirement.	The	United	Kingdom	noted	that	‘there	was	no
instant	or	overwhelming	necessity	for	self-defence’. 	Sierra	Leone	similarly	declared	that	‘the	plea	of	self-defence	is	untenable	where	no
armed	attack	has	taken	place	or	is	imminent’. 	Comparable	statements	were	made,	for	instance,	by	the	representatives	of	Niger	and
Oman.
Several	others	insisted	that	Israel’s	defence	claim	had	to	be	rejected,	since	the	exercise	of	the	right	of	self-defence	was	contingent	upon	the
occurrence	of	an	(actual)	armed	attack,	and	no	such	attack	had	taken	place. 	According	to	China,	for	example,	the	Charter	was	‘precise	and
clear:	the	right	to	self-defence	can	be	exercised	only	“if	an	armed	attack
References
(p.	334)	occurs	against	a	Member	of	the	United	Nations” ’. 	In	a	similar	vein,	Mexico,	stressed	that	‘it	is	inadmissible	to	invoke	the	right	to
self-defence	when	no	armed	attack	has	taken	place’.
On	12	June	1981,	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	IAEA	adopted	a	resolution	‘strongly	condemn[ing]	Israel	for	[its]	premeditated	and	unjustified
attack	on	the	Iraqi	nuclear	research	centre,	which	is	covered	by	Agency	safeguards’,	while	expressing	its	concern	over	the	harm	caused	by
the	Israeli	strike	to	the	IAEA	safeguards	regime. 	One	week	later,	the	Security	Council	unanimously	adopted	Resolution	487	(1981),	which
‘strongly	condemn[ed]	the	military	attack	by	Israel	in	clear	violation	of	the	Charter’;	‘call[ed]	upon	Israel	to	refrain	in	the	future	from	any	such
acts	or	threats	thereof’;	labelled	the	attack	‘a	serious	threat	to	the	entire	safeguards	regime	of	the	[IAEA]’;	and	‘fully	recognize[d]	the
inalienable	sovereign	right	of	…	all	States	…	to	develop	their	economy	and	industry	for	peaceful	purposes’. 	On	13	November	1981,	the
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General	Assembly,	by	109	votes	against	2	(Israel	and	the	United	States),	with	34	abstentions,	adopted	a	resolution	which	not	only	copied	the
aforementioned	findings	of	the	Security	Council	Resolution,	but	also	added	an	explicit	condemnation	of	the	Israeli	‘aggression’,	called	upon
all	states	to	cease	any	provision	of	arms	to	Israel,	and	requested	the	Security	Council	to	take	effective	enforcement	action	against	Israel.
The	IAEA	General	Conference	similarly	adopted	a	resolution	condemning	the	Israeli	‘act	of	aggression’.
III.		Questions	of	Legality
Having	examined	the	justifications	put	forward	by	Israel	and	the	reaction	of	third	states	at	the	UN	level,	the	present	section	further	examines
the	legality	of	the	Israeli	operation	and	its	treatment	in	legal	doctrine.	The	analysis	first	focuses	on	the	anticipatory	self-defence	argument
which	Israel	itself	put	forward	(section	1).	Subsequently,	section	2	explores	alternative	justifications	that	have	been	suggested	in	legal
scholarship,	such	as	the	argument	that	the	raid	against	the	Osiraq	reactor	did	not	amount	to	a	breach	of	Article	2(4)	of	the	UN	Charter.
1.		The	right	of	self-defence
According	to	D’Amato,	international	scholars	were	‘nearly	unanimous’	in	agreeing	that	Israel’s	Osiraq	raid	violated	international	law.
Israel’s	self-defence	claim	indeed	met	with	little	sympathy	in	legal	doctrine.	A	distinction	can	be	made	between	those	scholars	insisting	that
Article	51	of	the	UN	Charter	permits	the	exercise	of	self-defence	only	in
References
(p.	335)	reaction	to	a	prior	armed	attack,	on	the	one	hand,	and	those	accepting	the	permissibility	of	some	form	of	anticipatory	self-defence,	on
the	other	hand.
In	the	eyes	of	the	former	group,	absent	‘armed	attack’	against	Israel,	reliance	on	self-defence	was	obviously	excluded.	Thus,	according	to
Fischer,	the	strike	‘had	nothing	to	do	with	legitimate	self-defence,	which	is	possible	only	in	reaction	to	an	armed	attack’.
Yet,	supporters	of	anticipatory	self-defence	were	also	generally	of	the	opinion	that	the	Israeli	strike	was	unlawful,	because	Israel	was	not
acting	pursuant	to	an	‘imminent’	threat.	Mallison	and	Mallison,	for	instance,	observed	that	only	Israel	claimed	that	the	Osiraq	reactor	was
used	for	non-peaceful	purposes. 	This	claim	moreover	rested	upon	unverified	assumptions	and	inaccurate	statements	that	were	proven	to
be	erroneous	or	misleading. 	According	to	the	authors,	Israel	had	failed	to	meet	the	peaceful	procedures	requirement	for	anticipatory	self-
defence. 	Reference	was	also	made	to	the	fact	that	the	attack	had	long	been	planned	by	Israel	and	was	clearly	premeditated,	further
indicating	that	the	threat	was	not	imminent. 	Fischer,	while	nonetheless	dismissive	of	anticipatory	self-defence,	similarly	emphasized	that
the	strike	was	premeditated,	and	that	Israel	itself	had	acknowledged	that	Iraq	would	not	have	been	able	to	obtain	nuclear	weapons	until	1985
at	the	earliest. 	On	a	different	note,	Fischer	also	observes	that	expert	opinions	were	divided	as	to	the	risk	of	exposure	to	radioactive	fall-out
for	the	inhabitants	of	Baghdad	in	case	the	strike	had	been	postponed	until	after	the	reactor	became	operational.
Nydell’s	analysis	is	somewhat	different.	Contrary	to	the	previous	authors,	Nydell	appears	to	accept	that	Israel	credibly	believed	that	Iraq
sought	to	obtain	nuclear	weapons	and	that	it	had	the	nuclear	material,	the	knowledge,	and	the	technological	equipment	to	do	so. 	In	addition,
he	argues	that	Israel	had	no	reasonable	expectation	that	it	could	peacefully	prevent	Iraq	from	developing	a	nuclear	arsenal. 	While
acknowledging	that	Israel	had	relied	on	unfounded	or	misquoted	Iraqi	statements,	Nydell	further	finds	that	Iraq	was	openly	committed	to	the
destruction	of	Israel. 	In	spite	hereof,	Israel	acted,	not	in	order	to	prevent	an	imminent	(nuclear)	attack	against	it,	but	rather	to	prevent	Iraq
‘from	obtaining	substantial	political	and	military	power	in	the	future’. 	Nydell	thus	arrives	at	the	same	conclusion	as	the	aforementioned
authors,	notably	that	Israel’s	raid	could	not	qualify	as	anticipatory	self-defence	‘because	the	action	was	taken	before	an	imminent	threat	was
posed’.
A	rare	example	of	a	scholar	embracing	Israel’s	broad	‘preventive’	self-defence	claim, 	Kaplan	has	nonetheless	argued	that,	‘[a]lthough	a
surprise	nuclear	attack	upon	Israel	was	not	imminent’,	Israel	plausibly	could	have	perceived	that	Iraq	was	using	the	Osiraq	reactor	to
produce	nuclear	weapons	and	that	it	had	the	intention	to	bomb	Israel. 	Since	such	an	attack—even	if	not	imminently	forthcoming—could
have	extinguished	Israel’s	very	(p.	336)	existence,	the	threat	posed	by	Iraq	was	grave,	and	Israel’s	‘defensive	action	did	not	extend	beyond
the	scope	of	meeting	that	specific	threat’.
In	the	end,	it	is	hardly	surprising	that	Israel’s	self-defence	claim	has	been	widely	dismissed	in	legal	doctrine. 	First,	as	suggested	before,
legal	doctrine	has	long	been	divided	on	the	question	as	to	whether	international	law	permits	anticipatory	self-defence	at	all.	The	present
author,	for	one,	finds	unconvincing	the	argument	that,	notwithstanding	the	clear	text	of	Article	51	of	the	UN	Charter	(which	refers	to	the	right	of
self-defence	‘if	an	armed	attack	occurs’),	a	pre-existing	customary	right	of	anticipatory	self-defence	has	survived	the	adoption	of	the	UN
Charter. 	This	is	not	to	say	that	Article	51	of	the	UN	Charter	prohibits	states	from	‘intercepting’	an	armed	attack	that	has	been	set	in	motion,
even	if	its	consequences	have	not	yet	materialized. 	Yet,	it	does	suggest	that,	for	mere	threats	of	attack	to	trigger	the	right	of	self-defence,	it
must	be	demonstrated	by	reference	to	convincing	evidence	in	post-war	state	practice	that	the	‘anticipatory	self-defence’	thesis	has	gradually
come	to	be	accepted.
Second,	even	if	one	accepts	the	permissibility	of	anticipatory	self-defence	as	a	matter	of	principle,	this	doctrine	has	traditionally	been
construed	along	the	lines	of	the	Caroline	doctrine,	as	being	confined	to	situations	where	there	is	an	overwhelming	necessity,	‘leaving	no
choice	of	means	and	no	moment	for	deliberation’. 	Crucial	in	this	context	is	the	need	for	an	‘imminent’	armed	attack. 	While	an	impending
surprise	nuclear	attack	might	well	qualify	in	this	context, 	such	imminent	attack	was	manifestly	lacking	in	the	present	case.	This	is	so	even
if	one	were	to	accept	Israel’s	claim	that	Iraq	was	seeking	to	obtain	nuclear	weapons	and	that	it	was	nearing	that	goal	(notwithstanding	the	fact
Israel’s	allegations	were	contradicted	by	the	IAEA	and	by	France,	and	discounting	the	fact	that	several	of	its	statements	were	proven	wrong
or	misleading).	Indeed,	the	mere	development	of	a	nuclear	weapons	programme	by	another	state	cannot	simply	be	equated	to	an	imminent
threat	of	an	armed	attack. 	As	former	US	Legal	Adviser	Taft	recognized	in	2003—in
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(p.	337)	a	piece	defending	the	legality	of	the	2003	Iraq	war—‘[o]ne	may	not	strike	another	merely	because	the	second	might	someday	develop
an	ability	and	desire	to	attack	it’. 	It	is	worth	recalling	in	this	context	that,	even	if	the	Security	Council	has	occasionally	labelled	the
proliferation	of	nuclear,	chemical,	and	biological	weapons	a	threat	to	international	peace	and	security, 	there	is	de	lege	lata	no	rule	in	general
international	law	which	prohibits	a	state	from	developing	and/or	possessing	nuclear	weapons	per	se. 	Moreover,	from	a	military-strategic
perspective,	nuclear	weapons	are	in	principle	not	offensive	weapons,	but	rather	‘safety	devices’	intended	to	deter	large-scale	attacks	against
the	possessing	state.	Put	differently,	states	presumably	do	not	seek	to	acquire	nuclear	weapons	to	carry	out	concrete	attacks,	but	rather	to
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shift	the	strategic	and	geopolitical	balance	to	their	advantage.	Every	Head	of	State	is	aware	that	a	first	use	of	nuclear	weapons	would	not	only
make	it	a	pariah	in	the	international	community,	but	would	most	likely	entail	a	massive	military	response. 	In	Charter	terms	then,	the	fight
against	nuclear	proliferation	comes	within	the	framework	of	collective	security,	rather	than	that	of	self-defence.
2.		Alternative	legal	bases
If	Israel’s	self-defence	claim	must	be	rejected,	some	scholars	have	sought	alternative	legal	bases	to	defend	the	legality	of	the	Osiraq	raid.
D’Amato,	for	instance,	while	dismissing	the	anticipatory	self-defence	plea,	suggested	that	the	Israeli	strike	did	not	qualify	as	a	use	of	force
against	Iraq’s	‘territorial	integrity	or	political	independence’	in	the	sense	of	Article	2(4)	of	the	UN	Charter. 	Since	Israel’s	purposes	did	not	go
beyond	the	destruction	of	the	nuclear	reactor,	the	argument	goes,	Iraq’s	territory	remained	integral,	and	its	political	independence	was	not
compromised.	D’Amato’s	argument	nonetheless	flies	in	the	face	of	accepted	wisdom—corroborated	by	the	travaux	préparatoires	of	Article
2(4)	of	the	UN	Charter 	and	the	ICJ’s	Corfu	Channel	Case —that	Article	2(4)	encompasses	a	broad,
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(p.	338)	all-inclusive	prohibition,	which	also	extends	to	more	small-scale	operations	that	do	not	lead	to	any	form	of	territorial	loss	or	to	regime
change.
Alternatively,	a	few	scholars—including,	most	prominently,	Yoram	Dinstein—have	argued	that	the	Israeli	operation	could	be	justified	by	the
technical	‘state	of	war’	which	characterized	the	relations	between	Israel	and	Iraq	at	the	time	of	the	events. 	However,	as	others	have	rightly
observed,	this	argument	must	again	be	rejected. 	The	‘state	of	war’	is	a	concept	that	is	not	recognized	in	the	UN	Charter	and,	consequently,
cannot	prevail	over	the	prohibition	on	the	use	of	force. 	When	two	states	are	not	(or	no	longer)	actually	engaged	in	active	hostilities	(bringing
into	play	the	law	of	armed	conflict),	the	mere	absence	of	a	peace	treaty	or	formal	armistice	does	not	mean	that	Article	2(4)	of	the	UN	Charter
does	not	apply	between	them.	As	Quigley	notes,	‘[t]he	view	taken	consistently	by	the	international	community,	including	the	U.N.	Security
Council	has	been	that	actions	by	Israel	and	the	Arab	states	against	each	other	are	to	be	assessed	against	the	broader	standards	of	the	U.N.
Charter	on	use	of	force	and	self-defense’. 	This	approach	is	confirmed	by	the	treatment	of	the	Osiraq	raid.	Thus,	Israel	did	not	claim	that	the
‘state	of	war’	with	Iraq	meant	that	Article	2(4)	of	the	UN	Charter	was	inapplicable,	but	instead	sought	to	frame	its	actions	as	an	exercise	of	the
right	of	self-defence. 	In	the	debates	at	the	UN,	no	state	regarded	the	existence	of	a	‘state	of	war’	as	a	credible	legal	basis	to	justify	a
recourse	to	force,	and	some	explicitly	discarded	the	possibility	that	it	did.
Inasmuch	as	none	of	the	alternative	arguments	put	forward	in	legal	doctrine	provide	a	credible	legal	basis,	it	must	be	concluded	that	the
Osiraq	raid	constituted	a	violation	of	international	law,	and,	more	specifically,	infringed	the	prohibition	on	the	use	of	force.
IV.		Conclusion:	Precedential	Value
Israel’s	airstrike	against	the	Osiraq	reactor	constituted	the	first	time	a	country	openly	attacked	another	state’s	nuclear	facilities.	As	the	attack
was	directed	against	facilities	that	were	subject	to	IAEA	monitoring,	it	also	constituted	an	open	challenge	to	the	existing	non-proliferation
regime.	A	number	of	scholars	have	suggested	that,	while	the	reactor	was
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(p.	339)	ostensibly	used	for	peaceful	purposes,	the	raid	may	actually	have	had	the	paradoxical	effect	of	strengthening	the	nuclear	ambitions	of
the	Arab	states. 	By	contrast,	when	in	the	aftermath	of	the	1990–91	Gulf	War 	UN	inspectors	discovered	a	complex	of	buildings	serving	as
Saddam	Hussein’s	covert	nuclear	weapons	programme,	some	scholars	saw	this	as	a	vindication	of	Israel’s	erstwhile	position.
When	assessing	the	precedential	value	of	the	Osiraq	raid,	the	key	question	is	to	what	extent	the	universal	condemnation	of	the	raid	amounts
to	a	principled	rejection	of	the	legality	of	anticipatory	self-defence	by	the	international	community.	One	possible	interpretation	is	that	the
widespread	disapproval	was	simply	due	to	the	apparent	lack	of	evidence	that	Iraq	was	developing	a	nuclear	weapons	programme,	and	should
accordingly	not	be	taken	for	a	rejection	of	anticipatory	self-defence.	This	account	is,	however,	incomplete.
As	discussed	above,	it	is	clear	that,	in	defending	its	actions	before	the	UN	bodies,	Israel	deliberately	put	forward	a	novel	and	expansive
reading	of	the	right	of	self-defence,	departing	from	the	traditional	interpretation	of	anticipatory	self-defence	along	the	lines	of	the	Caroline
formula.	According	to	Israel	the	doctrine	of	anticipatory	self-defence	had	to	be	adapted	‘with	the	advent	of	the	nuclear	era’. 	In	particular,	it
had	to	be	adjusted	to	take	into	account	‘the	present-day	criteria	of	speed	and	power’. 	The	Israeli	argument	bears	striking	similarities	to	a
plea	formulated	more	than	two	decades	later,	when	the	Bush	administration	published	its	2002	US	National	Security	Strategy,	asserting
that:
[w]e	must	adapt	the	concept	of	imminent	threat	to	the	capabilities	and	objectives	of	today’s	adversaries	…	The	greater	the	threat
…	the	more	compelling	the	case	for	taking	anticipatory	action	to	defend	ourselves,	even	if	uncertainty	remains	as	to	the	time	and
place	of	the	enemy’s	attack.
Just	as	the	international	reaction	to	the	Bush	administration’s	attempt	to	broaden	the	doctrine	of	anticipatory	self-defence	to	cover	certain
‘non-imminent’	threats	was	widely	negative, 	Israel’s	attempt	to	carve	out	an	exception	from	the	‘imminence’	requirement	in	the	nuclear
context	met	with	strong	opposition	at	the	UN	level.	To	paraphrase	Abram	Chayes’	comments	on	the	1962	Cuban	missile	crisis,	the	general
feeling	was	that	Israel’s	concept	of	‘preventive’	self-defence	would	essentially	make	the	occasion	for	action	in	self-defence	‘a	question	for
unilateral	national	decision	that	would	not	only	be	formally	unreviewable,	but	not	subject	to	intelligent	criticism	either’. 	In	other	words:	it
would	open	the	door	to	the	‘law	of	the	jungle’.
Israel’s	Osiraq	raid	is	not	the	only	case	of	a	military	intervention	inspired	by	another	state’s	alleged	attempt	to	clandestinely	obtain	military
weapons.	Nor	is	it	the	only	example	of	an	air	strike	against	a	presumed	nuclear	facility.	As	is	well-known,	in	2003,	the	United	States	led	a
coalition	of	the	willing	into	Iraq,	resulting	in	the	overthrow	of	Saddam	(p.	340)	Hussein,	primarily	because	Iraq	was	suspected	of	developing
weapons	of	mass	destruction	(WMD)	in	contravention	of	the	Security	Council	resolutions	adopted	in	the	wake	of	the	1990–91	Gulf	War.
Interestingly,	in	spite	of	the	adoption	of	the	aforementioned	US	National	Security	Strategy	only	one	year	earlier,	the	United	States	did	not
justify	the	intervention	as	a	case	of	(anticipatory)	self-defence—as	Israel	did	in	1981—but	instead	sought	to	claim	(unconvincingly)	that	the
intervention	was	authorized	by	pre-existing	Security	Council	resolutions. 	The	allegations	pertaining	to	Saddam	Hussein’s	WMD
programme	later	turned	out	to	be	incorrect:	in	September	2004,	the	Iraqi	Survey	Group	declared	that	it	had	not	‘found	evidence	that	Saddam
possessed	WMD	stocks	in	2003’. 	Again,	in	September	2007,	Israel	carried	out	an	airstrike	in	Syria	(Operation	Orchard ),	which
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anonymous	sources	suggested	destroyed	a	presumed	nuclear	facility. 	(While	the	features	of	the	strike	appear	to	resemble	those	of	the
1981	Osiraq	raid,	it	is	worth	observing	that	Israel	did	not	report	the	strike	to	the	Security	Council	as	a	case	of	anticipatory	self-defence.
Instead,	it	refused	to	publicly	comment	on	the	nature	or	target	of	the	operation,	and	refrained	from	offering	any	legal	justification. )
It	follows	from	the	Osiraq	precedent	that	concerns	that	another	state	may	be	developing	or	acquiring	nuclear	weapons	(or	other	weapons	of
mass	destruction)	cannot,	of	themselves,	trigger	other	states’	right	of	self-defence.	Indeed,	while	the	threat	of	WMD	proliferation	should	not	be
underestimated,	the	proper	way	to	address	it	is	through	multilateral	negotiations,	the	IAEA,	and	the	UNSC.	To	carve	out	a	broad	right	of
‘preventive’	self-defence	vis-à-vis	nuclear	threats—as	Israel	unsuccessfully	pleaded	in	1981—would	essentially	accord	powerful	states	a
blank	cheque	to	decide	unilaterally	which	states	would	be	permitted	to	develop	nuclear	weapons	and	which	would	not—all	the	while
maintaining	and	upgrading	their	own	nuclear	arsenals.	Such	approach	is	hard	to	reconcile	with	the	acknowledgment	by	US	President	Obama,
in	his	2009	Cairo	speech,	that	‘[n]o	single	nation	should	pick	and	choose	which	nations	hold	nuclear	weapons’.
On	a	final	note,	the	question	remains	to	what	extent	the	Osiraq	raid	constitutes	a	relevant	precedent	affirming	the	legality	or	illegality	of
anticipatory	self-defence	in	response	to	‘imminent’	threats	of	attack.	Given	the	fact	that	no	imminent	threat	existed	and	that	(p.	341)	not	a
single	state	expressed	support	for	the	raid,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	the	raid	could	plausibly	qualify	as	a	useful	precedent	affirming	the
permissibility	of	anticipatory	self-defence	(as	some	have	nonetheless	suggested). 	At	the	same	time,	and	in	all	fairness,	the	broad
condemnation	of	the	raid	should	not	automatically	be	equated	to	a	principled	rejection	by	states	of	the	doctrine	of	anticipatory	self-defence.
First,	it	may	well	be	that,	in	light	of	the	assurances	of	the	IAEA	and	the	lack	of	compelling	proof	put	forward	by	Israel,	to	paraphrase	the	ICJ’s
Nicaragua	case,	many	states	found	that	‘the	lawfulness	of	a	response	to	the	imminent	threat	of	armed	attack	had	not	been	raised’, 	and
accordingly	chose	not	to	express	themselves	on	that	issue.	Second,	it	is	recalled	that	several	states	explicitly	or	implicitly	accepted	the
exercise	of	self-defence	in	reaction	to	‘imminent’	threats	of	armed	attack	(see	above).	Others,	by	contrast,	appeared	to	insist	that	the
exercise	of	self-defence	presupposed	the	occurrence	of	an	actual	armed	attack.	In	the	end,	the	only	conclusion	that	can	safely	be	drawn	from
the	UN	debates	(apart	from	the	categorical	rejection	of	‘preventive’	self-defence)	is	that	they	reveal	a	crack	in	states’	opinio	juris	when	it
comes	to	the	legality	of	anticipatory	action	in	response	to	‘imminent’	threats.
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Verbatim	Record	(17	June	1981)	UN	Doc	S/PV.2287	[61]–[64]	(League	of	Arab	States);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2288	(n	9)	[12]–[13]	(Uganda).
		Stressing	the	peaceful	nature	of	Iran’s	nuclear	programme	see,	eg,	UN	Doc	S/PV.2280	(n	9)	[147]	(Algeria),	[196]–[197]	(Jordan);	UN	Doc
S/PV.2281	(n	24)	[9]	(Kuwait),	[33]	(India),	[50]	(Cuba),	[69]	(Pakistan),	[82]	(Bulgaria);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2282	(n	24)	[24]–[25]	(Uganda),	[48]–[56]
(France),	[65]	(German	Democratic	Republic),	[83]	(Spain);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2283	(n	24)	[18],	[20]	(Ireland),	[66]	(Soviet	Union),	[84]–[85]
(Egypt),	[169]	(Mongolia),	[178]	(Zambia);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2284	(n	6)	[11],	[14]	(Niger),	[24]	(Philippines),	[45]	(Yemen);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2285	(n
24)	[9]–[10]	(Morocco),	[118]	(Bangladesh),	[140]	(Poland);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2286	(n	24)	[71]	(Italy);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2287	(n	24)	[22]	(Indonesia),
[32]	(Malaysia).
		UN	Doc	S/PV.2282	(n	24)	[48]–[54]	(France).
		ibid	[50]–[53]	(‘To	conclude	this	technical	aspect,	it	would	be	absurd	for	a	country	wishing	to	manufacture	a	nuclear	bomb	to	build	a
reactor	such	as	the	Tamuz	reactor	to	get	material	for	military	purposes.	As	everybody	knows,	there	are	simply	ways	to	achieve	that	goal:	the
purchase	of	centrifuges	for	the	enrichment	of	uranium,	or	the	construction	of	natural	uranium	reactors	for	making	plutonium,	for	example.’).
		ibid	[54].
		UN	Doc	S/PV.2288	(n	9)	[6]–[15]	(IAEA).
		ibid	[13].	In	a	similar	vein,	it	was	asserted	that	the	refurbishing	of	the	core	of	the	reactor	with	a	view	to	producing	plutonium	would	have
been	easily	detected.	ibid	[14].
		ibid	[15].
		See,	eg,	UN	Doc	S/PV.2280	(n	9)	[37]–[40]	(Iraq),	[133]	(Tunisia);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2281	(n	24)	[33]	(India),	[48]–[49]	(Cuba);	UN	Doc
S/PV.2282	(n	24)	[85]	(Spain);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2283	(n	24)	[47]	(Yugoslavia),	[122]	(Romania);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2284	(n	6)	[29]	(Philippines),	[38]
(Panama);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2285	(n	24)	[123]	(Bangladesh);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2286	(n	24)	[11]	(Guyana),	[30],	[39]	(Somalia);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2287
(n	24)	[9]	(Nicaragua),	[43]	(Sri	Lanka);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2288	(n	9)	[124]	(Mexico).	Note:	some	countries	drew	attention	to	the	fact	that	oil	is	a
depletable,	non-renewable	energy	source,	implying	that	oil-producing	countries	might	also	have	a	vested	interest	in	pursuing	nuclear	energy.
		See,	eg,	UN	Doc	S/PV.2282	(n	24)	[95]	(Japan);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2283	(n	24)	[149]	(Sierra	Leone);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2284	(n	6)	[6]
(Philippines);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2288	(n	9)	[30],	[157]	(United	States).
		See,	eg,	UN	Doc	S/PV.2280	(n	9)	[49]	(Iraq);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2282	(n	24)	[55]	(France),	[68]	(German	Democratic	Republic),	[108]	(United
Kingdom);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2283	(n	24)	[15]	(Ireland),	[47]	(Yugoslavia);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2284	(n	6)	[50]	(Yemen);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2286	(n	24)	[75]
(Italy);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2287	(n	24)	[20]	(Indonesia);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2288	(n	9)	[18]–[19]	(IAEA),	[121]–[122]	(Mexico).
		See,	eg,	UN	Doc	S/PV.2280	(n	9)	[48],	[51]	(Iraq),	[153]–[154]	(Algeria),	[176],	[180]	(Sudan),	[188]	(Jordan);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2281	(n	24)	[7]
(Kuwait),	[30]–[31]	(India),	[44]	(Cuba),	[66]–[67]	(Pakistan),	[84]	(Bulgaria);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2282	(n	24)	[21]	(Uganda),	[64]	(German
Democratic	Republic),	[88]	(China);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2283	(n	24)	[63]	(Soviet	Union),	[96]	(Egypt),	[114]	(Romania),	[138]	(Vietnam),	[150]
(Sierra	Leone),	[164]	(Mongolia);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2284	(n	6)	[22]	(Philippines),	[42]	(Yemen),	[62]	(Syria);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2285	(n	24)	[17]
(Morocco),	[97]	(Czechoslovakia),	[112]	(Bangladesh),	[135]	(Poland),	[146]	(Islamic	Group);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2286	(n	24)	[10]	(Guyana),	[27]–
[28]	(Somalia),	[46]	(Turkey);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2287	(n	24)	[5]	(Nicaragua),	[20]	(Indonesia);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2288	(n	9)	[112]	(Mexico).
		See,	eg,	UN	Doc	S/PV.2286	(n	24)	[4]	(Philippines,	speaking	on	behalf	of	the	Association	of	South-East	Asian	Nations).
		UN	Doc	S/PV.2288	(n	9)	[30],	[157];	UNGA	Verbatim	Record	(12	November	1981)	UN	Doc	A/36/PV.54	[20].
		See,	eg,	UN	Doc	S/PV.2280	(n	9)	[157]–[163](Algeria:	‘The	new	theory	of	“preventive”	aggression	is	the	very	negation	of	law	and	morality
…	[It]	would	in	future	authorize	any	State	to	attack	another	for	whatever	reason	it	considers	valid’);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2281	(n	24)	[39]	(Brazil),
[70]	(Pakistan),	[79]	(Bulgaria);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2282	(n	24)	[12]–[19]	(Uganda),	[77]–[78]	(Spain:	‘The	Charter	does	not	allow	for	…	any	right	to
preventive	action	by	which	a	Member	State	could	set	itself	up	as	judge,	party	and	policeman	in	respect	to	another	country’),	[89]	(China);	UN
Doc	S/PV.2283	(n	24)	[22]–[31](Ireland:	‘[S]uch	a	definition	of	self-defence	would	replace	the	basic	principle	of	the	Charter	…	by	a	virtually
unlimited	concept	of	self-defence	against	all	possible	future	dangers,	subjectively	assessed’),	[46]	(Yugoslavia),	[63]–[64]	(Soviet	Union),
[117]	(Romania),	[146]–[149](Sierra	Leone),	[167]	(Mongolia);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2284	(n	6)	[28]	(Philippines),	[47]–[48]	(Yemen),	[64]–[65]	(Syria);
UN	Doc	S/PV.2286	(n	24)	[15]–[16]	(Guyana),	[31]	(Somalia);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2287	(n	24)	[8]	(Nicaragua);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2288	(n	9)	[115]
(Mexico),	141	(Uganda);	UN	Doc	A/36/PV.53	(n	22)	[121]	(Syria),	[131],	[142]	(China),	[152]	(Turkey);	UN	Doc	A/36/PV.54	(n	37)	[2]	(India),
[9]	(German	Democratic	Republic),	[30]	(Austria,	warning	that	the	doctrine	‘would	replace	the	legitimacy	of	defence	against	armed	aggression
…	by	an	unlimited	and	uncontrolled	concept	of	armed	retaliation	against	all	possible	future	dangers	on	the	basis	of	a	very	subjective	and
unilateral	assessment	of	those	dangers’),	[40]	(Tunisia),	[65]	(Bulgaria),	[79]	(Soviet	Union);	UN	Doc	A/36/PV.55	(n	9)	[24]–[32]	(United	Arab
Emirates),	[39]–[40]	(Oman),	[52]	(Romania);	UNGA	Verbatim	Record	(13	November	1981)	UN	Doc	A/36/PV.56	[4]	(Guyana),	[62]	(Spain),
[80]	(Chile).
		UN	Doc	A/36/PV.53	(n	22)	[92].
		UN	Doc	A/36/PV.56	(n	38)	[119].
		UN	Doc	S/PV.2282	(n	24)	[106].
		UN	Doc	S/PV.2283	(n	24)	[147]–[149],	emphasis	added.	‘As	for	the	principle	of	self-defence,	it	has	long	been	accepted	that,	for	it	to	be
invoked	or	justified,	the	necessity	for	action	must	be	instant,	overwhelming	and	leaving	no	choice	of	means	and	no	moment	for	deliberation.
The	Israeli	action	was	carried	out	in	pursuance	of	policies	long	considered	…	and	was	plainly	an	act	of	aggression’.
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		UN	Doc	S/PV.2284	(n	6)	[11]	(‘there	was	aggression,	because	Israel	was	in	no	way	facing	an	imminent	attack,	irrefutably	proved	and
demonstrated’,	emphasis	added);	UN	Doc	A/36/PV.55	(n	9)	[39].	Consider	also:	UN	Doc	S/PV.2282	(n	24)	[15]	(Uganda,	citing	the	Caroline
doctrine);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2283	(n	24)	[25]–[26]	(Ireland);	UN	Doc	A/36/PV.55	(n	9)	[27]	(United	Arab	Emirates).
		See,	eg,	UN	Doc	S/PV.2282	(n	21)	[19]	(Uganda:	‘Article	51	is	explicit	in	stating	that	the	right	of	…	self-defence	is	only	permissible	in
response	to	an	armed	attack.	Since	there	was	no	armed	attack	against	Israel	…	how,	then,	can	Israel	take	refuge	under	Article	51?’),	[78]
(Spain:	‘Article	51	…	limits	that	right	to	a	case	of	armed	attack’);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2284	(n	6)	[65]	(Syria);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2286	(n	24)	[15]
(Guyana);	UN	Doc	S/PV.2288	(n	9)	[141]	(Uganda:	‘[A]s	has	been	stated	by	many	members,	in	order	to	bring	[the]	case	under	[the]	umbrella
[of	self-defence],	the	Israeli	representative	had	to	prove	an	armed	attack’);	UN	Doc	A/36/PV.54	(n	37)	[40]	(Tunisia);	UN	Doc	A/36/PV.55	(n	9)
[39]	(Oman);	UN	Doc	A/36/PV.56	(n	38)	[4]	(Guyana),	[80]	(Chile,	confirming	that	Article	51	only	allows	for	self-defence	‘in	the	case	of	prior
armed	aggression’).
		UN	Doc	A/36/PV.53	(n	22)	[142].
		UN	Doc	S/PV.2288	(n	9)	[115].
		Telegram	dated	12	June	1981	from	the	Director-General	of	the	International	Atomic	Energy	Agency	addressed	to	the	President	of	the
Security	Council	(15	June	1981)	UN	Doc	S/14532.
		UNSC	Res	487	(19	June	1981)	UN	Doc	S/RES/487.	In	its	Preamble,	the	resolution	makes	reference	to	the	documents	adopted	by	the
IAEA.	It	also	notes	that,	contrary	to	Israel,	Iraq	has	been	a	party	to	the	Non-Proliferation	Treaty,	and	that	the	IAEA	has	testified	that	the
safeguards	on	nuclear	activity	‘have	been	satisfactorily	applied	to	date’.
		UNGA	Res	36/27	(13	November	1981)	UN	Doc	A/RES/36/27.	For	voting	records,	see:	(1981)	Yearbook	of	the	United	Nations	282–83.
		IAEA	General	Conference,	‘Military	attack	on	Iraqi	nuclear	research	centre	and	its	implications	for	the	agency’,	Resolution	adopted
during	the	237th	plenary	meeting	on	26	September	1981,	GC(XXV)/RES/381.	The	resolution	was	adopted	by	51	votes	against	8,	with	27
abstentions.
		Anthony	D’Amato,	‘Israel’s	Air	Strike	Against	the	Osiraq	Reactor:	A	Retrospective’,	(1996)	10	Temple	International	&	Comparative	Law
Journal	259,	260.
		For	an	overview	of	the	arguments	invoked	by	both	camps,	See,	eg,	Tom	Ruys,	‘Armed	Attack’	and	Article	51	of	the	UN	Charter	(CUP
2010)	255–67.
		Fischer	(n	1)	163	(our	translation).
		Mallison	and	Mallison	(n	1)	427.	See	also	the	comments	by	Mallison	in	US	Senate	(n	1)	220ff.
		An	investigation	by	the	US	Congressional	Research	Service	showed	that	several	Iraqi	statements	invoked	by	Israel	were	taken	out	of
context	or	could	not	be	found.	CRS,	‘Quotations	regarding	Iraqi	nuclear	intentions’	(15	June	1981),	reprinted	in	US	Senate	(n	1)	58–69.
According	to	the	Washington	Post,	‘[a]t	least	six	of	[Israeli	Prime	Minister]	Begin’s	specific	claims	…	turned	out	[to	be]	erroneous	or
misleading	or	have	been	disputed	by	French	or	U.S.	officials’	(17	June	1981)	A22,	cols	1–2.
		Mallison	and	Mallison	(n	1)	429.
		ibid	430–31.
		Fischer	(n	1)	163,	165.
		Fischer	(n	1)	165.
		Nydell	(n	1)	474–78.
		ibid	482.
		ibid	472.
		ibid	488.
		ibid	471,	483.
		Also	accepting	this	claim,	see	the	statement	of	Arthur	J	Goldberg	before	the	US	Senate	Committee	on	Foreign	Affairs,	in	US	Senate	(n	1)
37.	See	also	the	comments	by	John	Moore	in	ibid	251–52.
		Kaplan	(n	1)	155–56.
		ibid	156.
		See,	eg,	authors	rejecting	the	idea	that	the	strike	was	a	lawful	exercise	of	self-defence:	Yoram	Dinstein,	War,	Aggression	and	Self-
Defence	(5th	edn,	CUP	2011)	199;	John	Quigley,	‘Israel’s	Destruction	of	Iraq’s	Nuclear	Reactor:	A	Reply’	(1995)	9	Temple	International	&
Comparative	Law	Journal,	441,	441;	Avra	Constantinou,	The	Right	of	Self-Defence	under	Customary	International	Law	and	Article	51	of	the
UN	Charter	(Bruylant	2000)	118.
		This	argument	goes	against	the	equal	normative	power	of	treaty	and	customary	law	and	the	lex	posterior	principle.	Further:	Ruys	(n	52)
7–19,	259–60.
		On	the	concept	of	‘interceptive’	self-defence,	see	ibid	265–67.	Crucially,	‘interceptive’	self-defence	does	not	settle	with	the	capacity	and
professed	intention	to	initiate	an	armed	attack,	but	presupposes	that	these	elements	are	accompanied	by	actual	measures	of	implementation.
		The	present	author	acknowledges	that	there	has	been	a	major	shift	post-9/11	in	states’	opinio	juris	as	well	as	in	legal	doctrine	towards	a
greater	acceptance	of	the	legality	of	self-defence	against	imminent	threats	of	attack.	See:	Ruys	(n	52)	305–67.	In	a	similar	vein:	Georg	Nolte
and	Albrecht	Randelzhofer,	‘Article	51’	in	Bruno	Simma,	Daniel-Erasmus	Khan,	Georg	Nolte,	and	Andreas	Paulus	(eds),	The	Charter	of	the
United	Nations:	A	Commentary	vol	2	(3rd	edn,	OUP	2012)	1423.	At	the	same	time,	several	scholars	contend	that	international	law	does	not
permit	any	form	of	anticipatory	self-defence.	See,	eg,	Olivier	Corten,	Le	droit	contre	la	guerre	(2nd	edn,	Pedone	2014)	662–717.
		See	further	the	Chapter	2,	‘The	Caroline	incident—1837’	by	Michael	Wood.
		Note:	in	the	Security	Council	debates,	Iraq	drew	attention	to	the	fact	that	Israel’s	quote	from	Sir	Humphrey	Waldock	was	incomplete	and
falsely	left	out	the	need	for	an	imminent	armed	attack.	UN	Doc	S/PV.2288	(n	9)	[199]–[201].
		Accepting	self-defence	in	the	face	of	a	surprise	nuclear	attack,	see,	eg,	Louis	Henkin,	How	Nations	Behave:	Law	and	Foreign	Policy	(2nd
edn,	Columbia	University	Press	1979)	140–44.
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		In	a	similar	vein,	see,	eg,	Quigley	(n	68)	441.	Drawing	attention	to	the	relevance	of	a	second-strike	capability,	see	Nolte	and	Randelzhofer
(n	71):	‘the	limitation	on	the	possibility	of	anticipatory	self-defence	embodied	in	Art.	51	is	compatible	with	the	strategy	of	nuclear	powers	only
as	long	as	States	are	able	to	defend	themselves	against	a	pre-emptive	strike	launched	against	them.	Should	this	so-called	second-strike
capability	fall	away,	the	limitation	on	the	possibility	of	anticipatory	self-defence	would	not	be	removed,	but	its	observance	by	States	would
nevertheless	likely	be	diminished.’
		William	H	Taft	IV	and	Todd	F	Buchwald,	‘Preemption,	Iraq	and	International	Law’	(2003)	97	American	Journal	of	International	Law	557.
Note:	the	authors	(response	to	Legal	Adviser	and	Assistant	Legal	Adviser	with	the	US	State	Department)	justified	the	2003	Iraq	war	by
reference	to	existing	Security	Council	resolutions,	rather	than	by	relying	on	the	right	of	self-defence.	On	the	2003	Iraq	war,	see	further	Chapter
49	by	Marc	Weller	in	this	volume.
		See,	eg,	UNSC	Res	1540	(28	April	2004)	UN	Doc	S/RES/1540.
		See,	eg,	Ruth	Wedgwood,	‘The	Fall	of	Saddam	Hussein:	Security	Council	Mandates	and	Preemptive	Self-defense’	(2003)	97	American
Journal	of	International	Law	576,	585.	Note:	the	ICJ	previously	held	that	‘[t]here	is	in	neither	customary	nor	conventional	international	law	any
comprehensive	prohibition	of	the	threat	or	use	of	nuclear	weapons	as	such’,	Legality	of	the	threat	or	use	of	nuclear	weapons,	Advisory
Opinion	[1996]	ICJ	Rep	226,	266.	A	fortiori,	one	might	add	that	there	is	no	comprehensive	prohibition	of	the	possession	of	such	weapons
(save	in	respect	of	states	that	have	ratified	the	2017	Treaty	on	the	Prohibition	of	Nuclear	Weapons).
		Consider,	eg,	Condoleezza	Rice,	‘Promoting	the	National	Interest’	(2000)	79(1)	Foreign	Affairs	45,	61	(suggesting	that	if	Iraq	or	North
Korea	were	to	acquire	WMD,	‘their	weapons	will	be	unusable	because	any	attempt	to	use	them	will	bring	national	obliteration’).	In	a	similar
vein:	Robert	S	McNamara,	‘The	Military	Role	of	Nuclear	Weapons:	Perceptions	and	Misperceptions’	(1983–84)	62	Foreign	Affairs	59,	79
(‘[N]uclear	weapons	serve	no	military	purpose	whatsoever.	They	are	totally	useless	–	except	to	deter	one’s	opponent	from	using	them’).
Further:	Phillip	Bobbitt,	Terror	and	Consent:	The	Wars	for	the	Twenty-First	Century	(Penguin	2008)	8:	‘It	is	now	possible	for	the	U.S.	to
determine	within	seconds	the	origin	of	any	ballistic	missile	launch	within	an	accuracy	of	ten	meters.	The	leadership	of	a	State	that	ordered
such	an	attack	would	face	the	certainty	of	an	immediate	and	annihilating	retaliatory	response.’
		D’Amato,	‘Israel’s	Air	Strike	Against	the	Osiraq	Reactor:	A	Retrospective’	(n	1)	585.	According	to	D’Amato,	the	Israeli	action	was	legal
under	international	law,	but	Israel	nonetheless	owed	monetary	compensation	to	Iraq	for	the	actual	damage	to	the	nuclear	facility	and	for	the
four	lives	that	were	lost	(ibid	584,	note	2).	In	a	later	article,	D’Amato	instead	adopts	the	view	that	the	Osiraq	raid	was	permissible	under
international	law	because	‘Israel	acted	as	a	proxy	for	the	international	community’.	See:	D’Amatao	(n	50)	262.	The	reader	is	nonetheless	left
to	wonder	how	this	argument	finds	a	basis	in	positive	law.
		United	Nations,	Documents	of	the	Conference	on	International	Organization,	vol	6,	304,	334–35,	556–58.	See	also:	Thomas	Franck,
Recourse	to	Force:	State	Action	Against	Threats	and	Armed	Attacks	(CUP	2002)	12.
		Corfu	Channel	(Albania	v	United	Kingdom)	[1949]	ICJ	Rep	35.
		See,	eg,	Ian	Brownlie,	International	Law	and	the	Use	of	Force	by	States	(OUP	1963)	265–68;	Dinstein	(n	68)	90;	Albrecht	Randelzhofer
and	Oliver	Dörr,	‘Article	2(4)’	in	Bruno	Simma,	Daniel-Erasmus	Khan,	Georg	Nolte,	and	Andreas	Paulus	(eds),	The	Charter	of	the	United
Nations:	A	Commentary	vol	2	(3rd	edn,	OUP	2012)	215	(with	references	(note	79);	observing	that	this	is	the	‘dominant	view’);	Ruys	(n	52)
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